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Global Insecurity: How Risk Theory Gave
Rise to Global Police Militarization
NICHOLAS S. BOLDUC*
ABSTRACT
Today, across the globe, police agencies are militarizing to confront
modern-day threats. This gradual shift towards militarized policing
stems from the concept of risk-risk has driven nations to amend their
laws so that their law enforcement agencies may militarize to meet
whatever risk they face. In the United States, the gradual shift towards
militarized police occurred after the crippling of the Posse Comitatus Act
in the face of the developing 'War on Drugs" However, America is a late
development in this trend; the majority of the Western world militarized
themselves through the concept of 'gendarmes", while the Chinese
militarized their police immediately after the Communist Revolution.
Moreover, the Chinese militarized police are becoming more relevant
today because of the Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong that threatens
the Communist regime.
In the councils of government, we must guard against
the acquisition of the unwarranted influence, whether
sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.
The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power
exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of
this combination endanger our liberties or democratic
processes.1
* Juris Doctor Candidate, 2016, Indiana University Maurer School of Law;
Bachelor's of Science in Criminal Justice summa cum laude, 2013, Eastern Kentucky
University. I would like to thank Professor David Delaney for his assistance on this Note.
I also would like to thank my parents for their unwavering support.
1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American
People (Jan. 17, 1961), in PUB. PAPERS, at 1038 (commonly known as the "Military-
Industrial Complex" speech). Eisenhower cautioned the United States about the sharp
military growth his tenure witnessed. The speech as a whole mainly concentrates on then-
recent developments that could threaten the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
After violent riots recently gripped Ferguson, Missouri, 2 politicians
and commentators began investigating the alleged militarization of
municipal police forces throughout the United States. Many in the
United States began wondering how and why this change in policing
occurred after waking up each morning to newspapers displaying
armor-clad local police officers and militarized vehicles on patrol in
Ferguson's streets. While the American public has just begun
investigating and educating itself about this alleged tactical shift in
policing, criminologists have long noticed a gradual trend towards
militarized policing, beginning primarily in the 1980s. 3 Peter Kraska, a
criminologist and student of militarized policing, theorizes that the
collapse of the Soviet Union created an opening for increased military
involvement with local police offices. 4 The trend towards increased
militarized policing, however, is not solely a U.S. phenomenon: the
police forces of other nations have similarly come to display militarized
policing characteristics and tactics. 5 The issue of police militarization6 is
thus a global one.
One explanation for this gradual shift rests with an everyday
concept: risk. Recent scholarship has noted that ours is a globe of "risk
societies." 7 This analysis posits that shifts in how a particular society
faces and responds to risk can have profound impacts on that society.
Moreover, due to globalization, certain risks confront the entire globe.
2. Protests and violence occurred in Ferguson, Missouri, after the death of Michael
Brown, an unarmed African-American teenager, at the hands of a Caucasian police officer.
3. See, e.g., PETER B. KRASKA ET AL., MILITARIZING THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM: THE CHANGING ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE POLICE (Peter B. Kraska
ed., 2001) (discussing different aspects of police "militarization," including the causes the
phenomenon, the emergence of weapon and personnel transfers from military to police,
and use of military units in waging the "war on drugs").
4. Peter B. Kraska, Crime Control as Warfare, in MILITARIZING THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CHANGING ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE POLICE
14, 16 (Peter B. Kraska ed., 2001) [hereinafter Kraska, Crime Control].
5. See, e.g., Derek Lutterbeck, Between Police and Military: The New Security Agenda
and the Rise of Gendarmeries, 39 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: J. NORDIC INT'L STUD.
ASS'N 45 (2004) (arguing that the emergence of new transnational threats has resulted in
increasing use of paramilitary gendarmerie forces in multiple different countries).
6. See Kraska, Crime Control, supra note 4, at 16 (defining "militarization" as the
process society undergoes to organize itself for "the production of violence or the threat
thereof').
7. See ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY (1992) [hereinafter BECK, RISK SOCIETY]
(introducing the concept of a "risk society" and arguing that these new risks go beyond
typical class or socio-economic barriers). See also ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD
(2003) (arguing that, due to globalization, new risks are affecting societies no matter
where those societies live or how privileged those societies are).
How RISK THEORY GAVE RISE TO GLOBAL POLICE MILITARIZATION269
Every nation subject to globalization now faces issues, including the rise
in militarized policing, that follow from a risk society.8
This Note explores how globalized risk and threat have influenced
nations to enact or amend their laws, causing a global shift to
militarized policing. Part I explores the concept of a "risk society" and
how risk calculation has led to changes in globalized societies. Part II
examines the "paramilitary policing juggernaut," which scholars believe
led different nations' police forces to shift towards paramilitary policing
because of transnational threats each of the nations faced. Part III
examines how the U.S. courts and the U.S. Congress have
systematically undermined the Posse Comitatus Act, which permitted
the gradual shift towards militarized policing within the United States.
A discussion applying risk-society theory to this shift in policing
demonstrates that the transnational drug distribution threat effectively
converted the United States into a world risk society.
Part IV discusses how police militarization is a global phenomenon.
First, the concept of "gendarmes" will be described, demonstrating how
these entities militarize the entire Western world by their similarities to
Special Weapons and Tactics teams seen in Anglo-Saxon nations. Next,
the People's Republic of China and its police force that responds to
large-scale rioting and demonstrations will be examined, followed by a
discussion describing how the current threat to China, internal societal
dissent, influenced the government's decision to create and use a
militarized police force to respond to demonstrations of dissent. Part V
provides a snapshot of several proposed legal and philosophical
solutions to the police militarization issue that plagues the United
States and the world. Finally, this Note will conclude with thoughts
regarding the future of militarized policing.
I. RISK--HOW A SIMPLE CONCEPT SHAPES NATIONS TODAY
Risk naturally drives different forces to respond to its appearance.
Anthony Giddens characterizes risk as "refer[ring] to hazards that are
actively assessed in relation to future possibilities."9 Societies today
view risk through a futuristic lens.' 0 Ulrich Beck argues further that
risk is how people foresee threats and attempt to control future
8. See ULRICH BECK, WORLD RISK SOCIETY (1999) [hereinafter BECK, WORLD RISK
SOCIETY] (arguing that global forces have spread risks to all nations, regardless of relative
levels of development).
9. GIDDENS, supra note 7, at 22.
10. See id. This statement should not be taken to posit that past societies did not view
risk in a futuristic sense.
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consequences; it is a median between security and destruction.1 '
Giddens distinguishes between two different forms of risk: external and
manufactured.12 External risks are manifested risks that occur outside
a designated area. 13 Manufactured risks, by contrast, are created by a
society's development of knowledge of the world. 14 Thus, manufactured
risks are created by the agenda a society has undertaken. As
manufactured risks expand, risk calculation becomes a major issue
because of society's need to confront the consequences of its actions. 15
The one prominent force that responds to the risks a society faces is law
enforcement. Police, among other societal bodies, do not know what
level of threat is involved with particular risks until it is too late to
prevent the threat.' 6 Therefore, actions that respond to threats and risk
are premised on mere guesswork, inferences, and predictions.
Giddens also notes a conundrum that arises frequently in political
responses to a given risk. If the government chooses to respond to the
risk, it must persuade society that the risk is real.' 7 If the risk does not
materialize, the response to it is seen as scaremongering. If, however, no
action is taken in response and the threat becomes a reality, society
views the government as having failed to protect it.18 Politicians thus
face a difficult quandary: do nothing and possibly face critique when a
preventable threat manifests itself, or do something and possibly face
critique when a threat does not manifest itself, and money, resources,
and time are expended for naught.
New risks are both global and local-a product of globalization. 19
Global threats shape national and international action, thus creating a
global domino effect. 20 In the context of societal expectations, when the
security of a society is violated, the state must take action.2' By
implication, therefore, risks that are global in scope often provoke
11. BECK, WORLD RISK SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 3, 135.
12. GIDDENS, supra note 7, at 26.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 26-28.
16. Cf. id. at 29 (stating how scientists and other government officials often cannot
recognize the severity of a risk until after it is too late).
17. Id. at 29.
18. See id. at 29-30. Thus there is an inherent dilemma. On the one hand, if measures
such as militarized policing are not undertaken, society may come to see its governing
body as failing to protect it from destruction. However, if measures are taken and
successful to the point of threat prevention, what evidence exists demonstrating the threat
existed and the measures taken were necessary?
19. See BECK, WORLD RISK SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 142.
20. See id. at 142-43.
21. Cf. id. at 66 (observing that the state must take action to maintain legitimacy).
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globalized action in response. 22 Of course, risk and threats affect
policing, and this effect will be explored in the next section of this Note
before shifting to a discussion of two different nations' legal responses to
risk in their societies, as clearly demonstrated through their police's
militarization of attire, tactics, and weaponry.
II. "THE PARAMILITARY POLICING JUGGERNAUT"
The global shift to militarized policing has roiled the United
States. 23 Hill and Beger define militarized police as police who operate
as units (rather than as individuals) after seeking and obtaining
instruction from military personnel. 24 This military instruction includes
training provided by military servicemen, training regarding the use of
"sophisticated weaponry, special apparel, and equipment."25 Hill and
Beger contend that the global shift towards militarized policing occurred
and continues to develop because modern nations must counter certain
clandestine results of globalization and because police forces are simply
prone to adopt militarized forms of policing.26
Certain clandestine results of globalization involve global threats.27
One such issue arises from clandestine transnational actors, defined as
"non-state actors who operate across national borders in violation of
state laws and who attempt to evade law enforcement." 28 Because of the
large variety of international threats, such as terrorism or transnational
drug distribution rings, the United States, among other nations, has
shifted to a "crimefare" state, where policing begins to incorporate a
distinctively militarized tone to better face and eliminate the defined
"enemy."29
22. See id.
23. Stephen M. Hill & Randall R. Beger, A Paramilitary Policing Juggernaut, 36 Soc.
JUST. 25, 25 (2009).
24. Id. at 26; see also JIM FISHER, SWAT MADNESS AND THE MILITARIZATION OF THE
AMERICAN POLICE (2010) (documenting many instances of militarized policing in different
situations, while also detailing the historical background that drove lawmakers to change
the law to permit police militarization).
25. Hill & Beger, supra note 23, at 26. Military personnel that provide training include
active and retired military servicemen. These personnel have been known to train police
forces in the use of automatic assault rifles, full body armor, and other military
equipment, such as military transportation vehicles and specialized military weapons and
tools. Id.
26. Id. at 25.
27. See id. at 26-29.
28. Id. at 27 (quoting Peter Andreas, Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the
Twenty-First Century, 28 INT'L SEC. 78, 78-79 (2003)).
29. See id.
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The treatment of all clandestine transnational actors as national
security threats further shifts police forces to militarization. 30 Because
risks and threats stemming from international drug distribution or
organized crime typically pass under the radar, nations, including the
United States, designate these risks as national security threats. By
categorizing such risks as threatening the nation's security as a whole,
military intervention and increased interaction with local law
enforcement is legitimized. 31 Indeed, any implication of national
security allows monetary and other resources to be made available to
combat the threat; thus, many issues are expressed as national security
concerns because politicians speculate that increased military
involvement will solve the problems. 32
However, police are also prone to militarize themselves. 33 Every
agency is militarized in some capacity, 34 and because federal funding
and equipment programs are readily available for law enforcement
agencies to combat clandestine threats, local agencies all over the
United States have gradually shifted to a militarized policing
approach. 35 Because of these clandestine transnational threats and the
natural inclination of police agencies to militarize, Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) teams have spread throughout the United States and
other Western nations.3 6 These teams specialize in responding to
atypical and dangerous situations such as riots and hostage-taking,
scenarios the standard neighborhood beat cop would not typically
30. Id. at 28.
31. See id. at 28; see also Ronald D. Crelinsten, The Discourse and Practice of Counter-
Terrorism in Liberal Democracies, 25 AUST. J. POLIT. HIST. 389, 398. Crelinsten observes
that the state vis-A-vis the military is looking for a "new enemy" after the Soviet collapse,
permitting military intervention.
32. See JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR
PERILOUS TIMES 14 (2007).
33. See Hill & Beger, supra note 23, at 30 (stating that the police are gravitating
toward militarizing themselves for several reasons, including as a reactionary measure to
being advised to adopt more nonthreatening "community policing" tactics; a self-interested
response to funding opportunities; and a hyper-masculine aesthetic and "warrior-mindset"
that is favored by today's police).
34. See Peter B. Kraska, Militarization and Policing-Its Relevance to 21st Century
Police, 1 POLICING 501, 503 (2007) [hereinafter Kraska Policing]. Kraska states that the
real issue is to what extent each police force is militarized. See id.
35. See generally FISHER, supra note 24, at 109-28. Here, Fisher articulates the
changes seen in small-town law enforcement. Many small agencies reaped the benefits of
federal funding and supply programs. For example, the Richland County, South Carolina
sheriffs office paid only $2,000 for a surplus M11 3A2 APC, which can carry multiple
SWAT officers in a large vehicle complete with a high-caliber machine gun. Id. at 112.
36. See generally id.
How RISK THEORY GAVE RISE TO GLOBAL POLICE MILITARIZATION273
encounter. 37 May and Headley note that the specialized, combat-like
situations for which SWAT officers are called in sharpen the
paramilitary character of SWAT-style policing because SWAT officers
respond to situations involving battle-like conditions or weaponry. 38
After being trained for combat situations by active-duty Navy SEALs
and other Special Forces soldiers-along with being fully outfitted with
goggles, Kevlar helmets, and automatic weapons commonly seen with
military forces-police officers who participate in SWAT calls resemble
soldiers in many ways when rushing into conflict. 39
Commentators have also noted that SWAT teams are no longer
solely confined to situations such hostage crises or sieges. Many police
departments have begun to utilize their SWAT teams in other ways,
such as executing routine search warrants. 40 According to Fisher, most
police departments use SWAT teams in the middle of the night against
private residences because this approach theoretically minimizes the
threat of violent resistance. 41  Finally, contrary to popular
misconception, militaristic policing and SWAT usage is not confined to
urban areas: many rural or less-populated municipalities also possess
specialized policing units that use militaristic tactics and weaponry just
as their urban counterparts do.42 For example, although a local county
had already equipped itself with a paramilitary policing unit, a public
university's campus police department came to possess a militarized
policing team in addition.43 A change in policing has indeed taken place
within the United States. 44
37. See DAVID A. MAY & JAMES E. HEADLEY, REASONABLE USE OF FORCE BY POLICE 60
(2008).
38. See id.
39. See FISHER, supra note 24, at 13.
40. See id. at 13-14 (stating that 75 percent of the nation's drug raids involve no-
knock, forced-entry drug searches); see also Matthew T. DeMichele & Peter B. Kraska,
Community Policing in Battle Garb: A Paradox or Coherent Strategy?, in MILITARIZING
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CHANGING ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES
AND THE POLICE 82, 89 (Peter B. Kraska, ed., 2001). When asked, a former commissioner
of New York City Police Department stated that whenever a suspect may be armed and
dangerous, the department would use specialized units. FISHER, supra note 24, at 14. This
practice then became common to all warrant executions. Id.
41. See FISHER, supra note 24, at 13.
42. See id. at 109-110. Scholars found that approximately 70% of police departments
in towns with a population between 25,000 and 50,000 people possessed militarized police
teams. Id. at 110. Even in towns that do not possess such capabilities, officers combine
and participate with other, similarly situated officers in militarized policing teams that
respond to situations in multiple jurisdictions. Id.
43. See id. The University of Central Florida possesses this capability,
44. This Note will later concentrate on policing throughout the world. See infra Part
Iv.
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Against this background of risk theory and the preliminary causal
factors of police militarization within the United States, this Note now
turns to an examination of the shift in United States law, both statutory
and decisional, which has permitted this gradual shift to militarized law
enforcement. The Note then begins a cursory exploration of risk-society
theory, as explained in the preceding section, to determine whether
Giddens' and Beck's theory holds when applied to the United States and
its current situation regarding paramilitary policing and risk.
III. PARAMILITARY POLICING AND THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT
A. A Brief History of the Posse Comitatus Act
During the late colonial period of American history, Great Britain
controlled its American colonies by subjecting them to military order. 45
The Boston Massacre and the subsequent British occupation preceding
the war for independence illustrate this proposition, and led to an
outright animosity toward the concept of militarized policing.46 Due to
this militaristic policing order, many documents of the revolutionary
period contain strong warnings against military intrusion into civilian
life. These documents include the Declaration of Independence, 47 the
Articles of Confederation, 48 and the Constitution. 49 Kealy notes that
Constitutional Convention delegates debated extensively over whether a
strong central army was necessary to protect the new Union.50
45. See generally Sandra Eismann-Harpen, Comment, Rambo Cop: Is He a Soldier
Under the Third Amendment?, 41 N. KY. L. REV. 119, 123 (2014). Eismann-Harpen
presents a lively analysis regarding the Third Amendment and how the protection against
the quartering of soldiers could be applied to ordinary police officers due to the militaristic
shift in policing within the United States.
46. See Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil
Law Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POLY REV. 383, 389-90 (2003).
47. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). Several of the grievances
against King George in this document include:
He [King George] has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the
[clonsent of our legislatures. He has affected to render the Military independent of and
superior to the Civil power .... For Quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:...
• He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the
works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of [c]ruelty &
perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages .... (emphasis added).
48. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 4, which states:
No vessels of war shall be kept up in time of peace, by any [SItate, except such number
only, as shall be deemed necessary by the [United [S]tates, in [C]ongress assembled ....
nor shall any body of forces be kept up, by any [Sitate, in time of peace,....
49. See generally U.S. CONST. (providing limitations on the intrusive powers of the
military).
50. See Kealy, supra note 46, at 391.
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Eventually, the Convention resolved to create such an army. However,
the delegates imposed several limitations on the army's power.51
Specifically, the military was only to take up arms to neutralize local
insurrections when they arose. 52 Moreover, Congress further limited the
military's domestic role by deciding to use local militias to quell any
tense or violent situations that civilians could not control themselves.53
Kealy contends that this limit clearly articulated Congress's intent to
exclude the use of the military from all domestic law enforcement
matters, instead allowing the local militia and civilians to intervene as
much as possible.5 4
However, the years directly preceding the Civil War exhibited an
application of policing orders completely inconsistent with the early
Congress's intent, as the standing military began to drift into domestic
law enforcement matters. Soldiers participated personally in law
enforcement and, if local authorities remained superior to the military
force, such forces executed local law. 55 After the Civil War and
throughout Reconstruction, Congress placed the former Confederate
states under martial law, using the United States Army exclusively as
police officers.56 Thus, local crimes such as moonshining and cattle
rustling came under military control and jurisdiction.57
As the United States approached the end of the nineteenth century,
the presidential election of 1876 ushered in more than the end of
Reconstruction. After a dispute regarding electoral votes arose in
several states, Congress decided the presidency. In a quid pro quo
bargain, eventual winner Rutherford B. Hayes acceded to the Southern
states' demand that federal military troops cease their enforcement of
local law and be removed from their territories. 58 Thus, Hayes ended the
military's reign over local law enforcement in the former Confederacy as
well as in other areas. Congress then enacted the primary statute which
historically barred the military's involvement in domestic law
enforcement: the Posse Comitatus Act. 59
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16.
52. See Kealy, supra note 46, at 391.
53. See First Militia Act of 1792, ch. 28 § 2, 1 Stat. 264.
54. Kealy, supra note 46, at 392.
55. See id. at 393.
56. See id.
57. Id. Kealy also documents how the military would integrate themselves into
Southern legislatures and affect local politics. Id.
58. See id. at 394.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (West 2015). The Act provides:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a
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The short, substantive, plain text of the Posse Comitatus 60 Act
leaves little room for debate regarding Congress's clear intention for the
standing military to play only a limited role within the domestic law
enforcement arena. Kealy inferred that, preceding the enactment of the
Posse Comitatus Act, Congress likely felt that civilians' legal control
over their territory would soon be eroded by increased military
interference. 61 Thus, Congress passed the Act, reaffirming the Founders'
vision of a limited military intrusion into civilian life. In years past, the
Act prohibited military intervention in all but a few law enforcement
affairs. In fact, the Posse Comitatus Act was so successful that, due to
the complete lack of the Act's invocation throughout multiple decades of
history, one court pointedly noted that the Act was "all-but-forgotten" in
American legal history. 62 Recently, however, the courts and Congress
have actively carved out various exceptions to the Act, thereby leading
America to the dramatic increase of paramilitary policing noted today.
B. The Posse Comitatus Act-A Crippled Statute
Commencing in the 1970s, both Congress and the courts actively
eroded the Posse Comitatus Act. First, throughout the decades, the
courts decided a variety of cases which cumulatively led to the
disintegration of the Act's effectiveness. United States v. Red Feather63
provides an excellent illustration of this erosion. In Red Feather, the
United States charged multiple criminal defendants with interfering
with law enforcement officers lawfully engaged in the performance of
their duties. 64 Red Feather, one of the defendants, contended that the
posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
60. See ERIC V. LARSON & JOHN E. PETERS, PREPARING THE U.S. ARMY FOR HOMELAND
SECURITY: CONCEPTS, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS, RAND CORP. app. D, OVERVIEW OF THE POSSE
COMITATUS ACT, at 243 (2001), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
monographreports/MR1251/MR1251.AppD.pdf. "Posse comitatus" is defined by Black's
Law Dictionary as 'power of the county'... A group of citizens who are called together to
help the sheriff keep the peace or conduct rescue operations." Posse Comitatus, BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
61. See Kealy, supra note 46, at 394.
62. Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 936 (1st Cir. 1948).
63. United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1975).
64. Whoever commits or attempts to commit any act to obstruct, impede, or interfere
with any fireman or law enforcement officer lawfully engaged in the lawful performance of
his official duties incident to and during the commission of a civil disorder which in any
way or degree obstructs, delays, or adversely affects commerce or the movement of any
article or commodity in commerce or the conduct or performance of any federally protected
function--Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id. at 918 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) (1971)).
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government agents involved 65 were not lawfully performing their duties
because they were violating the Act.66 The defendants claimed that
military involvement in the situation, which included the law
enforcement agents' use of specialized military equipment and senior
military experts' observation regarding whether the military needed to
be called in, constituted a violation of the Act. 67 After extensively
reviewing the history of the Act's passage, the court ruled that no such
violation occurred. 68 Reasoning that Congress intended that the Act
would halt the military's direct interference with civilian law
enforcement duties,69 so long as the military involvement in civilian law
enforcement remained indirect or passive in a scenario, no violation of
the Posse Comitatus Act occurs. 70  Thus, donations of military
equipment, supplies, and expertise may be made to local law
enforcement without violating the Act.
The active-passive distinction articulated in Red Feather was upheld
in a later case, United States v. Hartley.71 In Hartley, the United States
convicted two defendants of illegally importing marijuana into the
United States. 72 The defendants appealed their convictions, arguing
that the Air Force played too active a role in their capture.7 3 The court,
65. The agents included members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United
States Marshals Service, and military personnel. See Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. at 919.
66. See id. at 920.
67. See id. at 921.
68. See id. at 921-24.
69. See id. The court stated: "Activities which constitute an active role in direct law
enforcement are: arrest; seizure of evidence; search of a person; search of a building;
investigation of crime; interviewing witnesses; pursuit of an escaped civilian prisoner;
search of an area for a suspect and other like activities." Id. at 925.
70. Id. at 925. The court also listed several military interventions in civilian law
enforcement that constitute passive assistance:
aerial photographic reconnaissance military personnel under orders to report on the
necessity for military intervention; preparation of contingency plans to be used if military
intervention is ordered; advice or recommendations given to civilian law enforcement
officers by military personnel on tactics or logistics; presence of military personnel to
deliver military material, equipment or supplies, to train local law enforcement officials on
the proper use and care of such material or equipment, and to maintain such materiel or
equipment; aerial photographic reconnaissance flights and other like activities. Id.
71. United States v. Hartley, 796 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the
exclusionary rule is not proper when no military personnel directly participated in the
interdiction of the defendants' aircraft or arrest).
72. See id. at 113.
73. See id. The defendants sought reversal, arguing that the district court should have
suppressed inculpatory evidence seized in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. Id. A
United States Customs agent flew with Air Force personnel who were engaged in a
training operation. Id. By regulation, the Air Force permitted this travel so long as the
aircraft possessed space for the extra person. Id. While engaged in this training exercise,
military personnel alerted Customs of an unidentified flying object. Id. The Customs agent
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however, affirmed both convictions, finding that this indirect assistance
to law enforcement was not of the active kind prohibited by the Act.7 4
Other circuits subsequently developed the active-passive line in their
cases, holding that an arrest by National Guardsmen, acting under a
state governor's order, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act 75 and
that the Act does not apply to the Coast Guard when it makes an arrest
at sea.
76
These holdings indicate that the active-passive distinction severely
undermined the Posse Comitatus Act by permitting military
intervention in civilian law enforcement in subtle fashions. When the
military may assist police until it reaches the far outer limit of active
intervention (e.g. actively engaging common criminals while acting as
law enforcement), the Posse Comitatus Act is inherently crippled.
The rise of new risks beginning in the late 1960s and continuing
through the 1980s may explain the judiciary's dismantling of the Act.
An enormous amount of social strife took shape during this time, as
anti-Vietnam War protests, racial riots, and general societal unrest and
upheaval destabilized the public. 77 Fisher, along with others, traces the
supposed need for police militarization to this time period, citing the
year 1968 as the beginning of the movement.78 In 1967, the Los Angeles
Police Department created the United States' first paramilitary police
response unit.79 This unit won widespread public and political support
for engaging in a high-profile shootout with the Black Panthers on
December 9, 1969.80 Other similar units began to form shortly
thereafter.8 1
told his office of the other aircraft and its landing location, the both defendants were soon
arrested and the evidence was seized. See id. at 113-14. At no time did the Air Force stop
its training exercise. Id. at 113.
74. Id. at 114 (quoting Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. at 925). The Fifth Circuit also held
that, even if the Posse Comitatus Act had been violated, the remedy was not suppression.
Id. at 115 (citing United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979)).
75. See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 165 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 1999).
76. See United States v. Chaparro-Almeida, 679 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1982).
77. See FISHER, supra note 24, at 3.
78. Id.
79. Id. Interestingly, the name for this specialized paramilitary police unit originally
was the "Special Weapons and Attack Team." Id. Apparently Los Angeles politicians did
not approve of this harsh, provocative name, and the name was soon changed to the
familiar "Special Weapons and Tactics Team." Id. However, Radley Balko, among other
scholars, observed this name change was merely "cosmetic" and that no real change
occurred regarding the team's tactics and mission. Radley Balko, The Militarization of
America's Police Forces, 11 CATO'S LETT'ER 1, 3 (2013), available at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/catosletter-vl ln4.pdf.
80. See Balko, supra note 79, at 3.
81. See FISHER, supra note 24, at 3. However, this team was heavily scrutinized for
their showdown with the Symbionese Liberation Army. Id. at 4. This shootout involved
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However, beginning in the 1970s, the United States began facing an
issue that continues to plague it to this very day: illicit narcotics.
President Richard Nixon commenced the modern War on Drugs at this
time.8 2 Ten years later, President Ronald Reagan continued Nixon's
mission by statutorily undermining the Posse Comitatus Act.8 3 Two
statutes signed into law in this period illustrate the trend: the
Comprehensive Drug Prevention and Control Act of 197084 and the
Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Officials Act.85 The latter
permitted the military to share information regarding illegal drugs that
was collected during normal military operations with civilian law
enforcement officials, thus placing the military in an integral role in
domestic law enforcement.8 6  Finally, the National Defense
Authorization Act87 erased any residual effect the Posse Comitatus Act
might still have had.
The National Defense Authorization Act statutorily permitted the
transfer of Department of Defense property to local law enforcement
agencies.88 This statute, under what is now colloquially known as the
"1033 program," allows civilian police to obtain surplus military
equipment at no or minimal cost.8 9 Scholars trace this program's effect
as the primary driving force behind the supply of military equipment to
local police.90 When local law enforcement carries out missions using
extensive Kevlar body armor, appears in armored personnel carriers
almost thousands of bullets being exchanged between the two sides. See id.
Notwithstanding the level of violence engaged in, the idea of specialized paramilitary
teams spread like wildfire throughout the nation because of the national syndication of
this gunfight on live national television. See Balko, supra note 78, at 3 (stating that the
public became enamored with the romanticized idea of specialized forces).
82. Balko, supra note 79, at 3.
83. See Kealy, supra note 46, at 409; see also Kraska Policing, supra note 34, at 502.
84. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
85. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-78 (1988).
86. Id. § 371(c). The section states: "The Secretary of Defense shall ensure, to the
extent consistent with national security, that intelligence information held by the
Department of Defense and relevant to drug interdiction or other civilian law enforcement
matters is provided promptly to appropriate civilian law enforcement officials." Id.
87. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No.
101-189, 103 Stat. 1352 (1989).
88. See id. § 1208.
89. See id. § 1208(b), which provides: "The Secretary may transfer personal property
under this section only if-(1) the property is drawn from existing stocks of the
Department of Defense; and (2) the transfer is made without the expenditure of any funds
available to the Department of Defense for the procurement of defense equipment."
90. See generally FISHER, supra note 24 (discussing the militarization of the police, the
utilization of military tactics and equipment, and the statistical evidence of its
ineffectiveness).
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suitable for Middle Eastern warzones, and raids homes armed with
assault rifles, I argue that the distinction between the standing military
and local law enforcement is largely destroyed. 91 Indeed, the 1033
program boasts that it has transferred over five billion dollars in
surplus military equipment, including $980 million in military
equipment in 2014 alone. 92 More than 8,000 law enforcement agencies
enrolled in the program and collected items ranging from office supplies
to heavy armaments.9 3 Clearly, this program has influenced the rise of
today's policing system, but as with every government program, there is
a catalyst. Once again, the catalyst is the rise of illicit drugs in America,
and this concept must now be explored in relation to the concept of risk
and the world risk society.
C. Transnational Narcotics Distribution Rings
In the 1970s, the United States commenced its 'War on Drugs"
under the Nixon administration. 94 Throughout his tenure, Nixon
presided over police actions against illicit narcotics which included
militaristic tactics such as no-knock raids on private areas that were
conducted throughout the nation.95 Nixon began this movement against
illicit drugs because he saw narcotics as a substantial threat due to the
extensive amount of drug addiction plaguing returning Vietnam
servicemen. 96 Although the system was eventually repealed in 1974, it
later made a comeback. 97 Moreover, Nixon also began facilitating
91. See id. at 13.
92. About the 1033 Program, DEF. LOGISTICS AGENCY DISPOSITION SERVS.,
http://www.dispositionservices.dla.mil/leso/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
93. Id.
94. Balko, supra note 79, at 3.
95. See id. According to Balko, Nixon adopted this policy to abrogate the usual "knock-
and-announce" rule based on the idea of a young United States Senate aide. Id.
96. See Susan Stuart, War as Metaphor and the Rule of Law in Crisis: The Lessons We
Should Have Learned from the War on Drugs, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 7-8 (2011). Nixon stated,
"America's public enemy number one in the United States is drug abuse. In order to fight
and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive." President Richard
Nixon, Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
(June 17, 1971), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/wslindex.php?pid=3047. For a detailed
account of Vietnam drug use, see Daniel Chang, Military Drug Use in the Literature of
the Vietnam War (Dec. 20, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard
University), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8965621. Chang states that drug
use became so prevalent, the United States Armed Forces were threatened. Id. at 2-3.
Studies indicated that approximately 80% of soldiers tried marijuana while 34% tried
heroin while serving. Id. at 3. This evidence demonstrates how drug dependency,
especially dependency that affected a war, would be seen as a threat. Soldiers would
return home hooked on drugs and constitute a new danger.
97. Balko, supra note 79, at 3.
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paramilitary policing by being the first president to describe narcotics
as a threat to the national security of the United States.98
Paramilitary policing became a policy point during Ronald Reagan's
tenure. For example, passage of the Military Cooperation with Civilian
Law Enforcement Act in 1981 permitted the use of the military to assist
law enforcement and consequently blurred the line between the military
and police in confronting the drug smuggling problem. 99 This statute
began the mixing of military and police, 100 but the transnational drug
threat remained. On President George H. W. Bush's inauguration, a
more intensive drug interdiction effort began, using both the military
and local law enforcement. 1 1 For example, Bush created and appointed
the United States' first drug "czar" to control the Office of National Drug
Control Policy. 0 2 Raphael F. Perl observes that another significant
piece of Bush's early antidrug policies was to "encourage increased
levels of Andean nation military involvement in counter-narcotics
operations" and "provide for enhanced US military support to host
nation counter-narcotics forces."'1 3 Because of the wealth of drugs
coming from Latin America, the proposal focused on improving the
military and law enforcement features of Latin American nations by
supplying, training, and funding these units to combat drugs within
their nations. 10 4 Thus, while the United States militarized its police
forces because of the transnational drug distribution threat, nations
outside of the United States militarized their police forces because of the
United States' effort to combat the drug threat.
Applying Giddens's and Beck's theory of risk and the risk society,
the United States and its local law enforcement system appears to have
undergone militarization because of the risks presented by the
98. See Stuart, supra note 96, at 5; cf. BAKER, supra note 32, at 14. By declaring
transnational drugs (or drugs generally) a threat to national security, the military could
begin involving itself in drug interdiction. Baker posits that anything could be classified as
a matter of national security and that many legislators frame issues in this way to gain
military or Defense Department assistance. See id. at 14-15.
99. See John W. Probst, The Posse Comitatus Act: What Does It Mean to Local Law
Enforcement?, POLICE CHIEF MAGAZINE, available at http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/
magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display-arch&article-id=335&issuejid=72004.
100. See 10 U.S.C. § 375.
101. See generally Stuart, supra note 96, at 10-11 (discussing President Bush's rhetoric
and its effect on the War on Drugs).
102. Friday: 25th Anniversary of President George H. W. Bush's Infamous Oval Office
Speech Escalating "War on Drugs" DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, available at
http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2014JO9/friday-25th-anniversary-president-george-hw-
bushs-infamous-oval-office-speech-escalatin.
103. Raphael F. Perl, United States International Drug Policy: Recent Developments and
Issues, J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. Winter 1990, at 123, 124.
104. See id.
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transnational drug trade. First, the military naturally needed a task to
complete, some new threat to U.S. society that had to be conquered after
the conclusion of the Cold War. 105 Without the threat of nuclear war
with the Soviet Union, and later Russia, looming, U.S. society was
actively attempting to break away from the issue that plagued it since
the Iron Curtain fell.106
The United States believed that the transnational drug trade
constituted a risk, a danger that could cause trouble to its citizens in the
present and the future. 0 7 The drugs being transported into the United
States from abroad manifested a new external risk, 08 one being
orchestrated by clandestine transnational actors over whom no
government really possessed any control. 0 9 The threat of "spillover
violence" also followed the transnational drug trade. 110 These fears led
to the gradual evolution from a warfare state, one that was actively
engaged in the Vietnam War (among other Cold War conflicts
internationally), to a "crimefare" state."' Law enforcement became
increasingly integrated with the military under presidential and
congressional policies. 1 2 Thus, narcotics were addressed as a national
security matter, permitting the inclusion of the military-in technology,
equipment, and expertise in local law enforcement actions." 3
105. See Kraska, Crime Control, supra note 4, at 16, 18.
106. Cf. GIDDENS, supra note 7, at 22 ("[r]isk presumes a society that actively tries to
break away from its past").
107. Cf. id. ("[r]isk refers to hazards that are actively assessed in relation to future
possibilities").
108. Cf. id. at 26 ("[elxternal risk is risk experienced as coming from the outside, from
the fixities of tradition or nature").
109. See Hill & Beger, supra note 23, at 27.
110. See John Burnett, 'Spillover' Violence From Mexico: Trickle or Flood?, NPR (Aug. 7,
2012, 3:29 PM), available at http://www.npr.org/2011/07/06/137445310/spillover-violence-
from-mexico-a-trickle-or-flood. According to this article, the federal government describes
"spillover violence" as drug-related violence that targets innocent civilians or law
enforcement on U.S. soil. However, some citizens believe this description is too narrow,
describing it as trafficker-on-trafficker violence in the United States that originates with
Mexican organized crime.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 27, 29.
113. See Drug Trafficking Violence in Mexico: Implications for the United States Before
the S. Caucus on Int7 Narcotics Control, 111th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Kevin L.
Perkins, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, and Anthony P. Placido,
Assistant Administrator for Intelligence), http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/drug-
trafficking-violence-in-mexico-implications-for-the-united-states (testifying that
transnational drug threat continues to pervade American society today, especially over the
porous southwestern border, and that violence follows the drug trade, primarily as a
spillover from drug trade); cf. GIDDENS, supra note 7, at 27 (regarding "external risk").
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Examining this evidence, I argue that, not only did the United
States become a risk society, it also became a "world risk society."
Because of the nature of the international drug distribution risk,
involving nonstate actors who affected multiple nation-states, this new
risk constituted one that was local and global simultaneously. 114 This
hazard shaped global action1 15 because the United States provided
funding and training for Latin American governments to suppress and
destroy the drug trade that was originating in their nations in much the
same fashion that the United States trained them to combat the
Communist threat earlier in the century. 1 6 For example, Perl indicates
that the United States provided an increasing amount of military aid to
three Latin American nations over the course of four years, 117 while also
stating that, in these nations, United States military personnel provided
training for police in areas such as "small unit tactics, leadership, and
airmobile and riverine operations."'1 8 Clearly, global action was
prompted by this domestic issue, converting the United States into a
"world risk society." 119
IV. WORLD RISK SOCIETY AS GLOBAL PHENOMENON
The militarization of a nation's police forces does not confine itself to
purely one or a handful of nations, but rather constitutes a global
phenomenon. The concept of the "gendarmerie" illustrates this primary
point. Lutterbeck defines "gendarmerie" as a term "usually applied to
police forces which have certain military characteristics and some
degree of military capability even though strictly speaking they are not
part of the armed forces.' 20 Originally developed in France, many other
European nations soon adopted these forces. Nations primarily tasked
gendarmes with maintaining order throughout their territories.1 21 P. A.
114. Cf. BECK, WORLD RISK SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 142 (showcasing how certain
distinctions can become fluid, such as the boundary between work and non-work).
115. See id. at 142-43.
116. See Perl, supra note 103, at 128-29.
117. Id. at 129. The particular nations are Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. In 1988, the
United States transferred only $400,000 to Bolivia in military aid; by 1989, the United
States increased its military financing to almost $5,500,000. Id. Disturbingly, the United
States expected to provide an estimated $40,000,000 in military aid to Bolivia in 1990. Id.
118. Id. at 130.
119. See generally, e.g., Angel Gustavo L6pez-Montiel, The Military, Political Power, and
Police Relations in Mexico City, LATIN AM. PERSP., Mar. 2000, at 79 (discussing
relationship between U.S. agencies and Mexican law enforcement institutions, and their
competition for political power).
120. Lutterbeck, supra note 5, at 47.
121. See id.; see also, e.g., PETER ANDRADE, WORLD POLICE & PARAMILITARY FORCES 67-
68 (1985). Andrade observes that the French gendarmerie formed in the 1300s under the
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J. Waddington observes that gendarmes are completely paramilitary, 122
tasked with dealing with particularly difficult internal security
situations. To accomplish these ends, gendarmes possess stronger
weaponry than common police officers in their respective nations. 123
Moreover, the fact that European governments typically organize these
elite peacekeeping forces under their respective defense ministries
further blurs the distinction between intrastate policing and the
military. 124 One particular example of the gendarmerie concept is the
Spanish Guardia Civil, which played an instrumental role in Francisco
Franco's campaign against political dissent throughout his reign. Today,
the Guardia Civil functions as an elite counterterrorist and antidissent
vehicle of the government, directing efforts against the Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna (ETA), for example. 125
While Lutterbeck states that nations such as the United States and
United Kingdom differ from the European gendarmerie model, clearly
the distinction is minute. While the United States and other Anglo-
Saxon nations do not possess centralized police or a centralized
paramilitary response unit per se, 126 the 1033 program and loosening of
the Posse Comitatus Act allows for an easy comparison between the two
models' militarized tactics, history, response purposes, and weaponry,
especially when considering the SWAT teams that pervade local law
enforcement. Thus, one could broadly observe that all Western nations
lean on their paramilitary policing capabilities to combat risk and
threats and have so for quite some time now. However, the global police
monarchy and was tasked with enforcing military law throughout France. See id. at 67.
Napoleon Bonaparte greatly expanded this force's use by developing an internal security
network. See id. Today, one part of the French gendarmerie responds to city officials if
civil unrest occurs. Id. at 68.
122. P.A.J. Waddington, Armed and Unarmed Policing, in POLICING ACROSS THE
WORLD: ISSUES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 151, 154 (R.I. Mawby ed., 1999).
123. Lutterbeck, supra note 5, at 47. Lutterbeck states that gendarmes utilize armored
cars, small airplanes, helicopters, and light infantry weapons; gendarmes also have
participated in various wars and other extraterritorial conflicts. See id. France's
gendarmerie fought in all of France's major wars. See id.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 49. The ETA is a Basque separatist organization that seeks an independent
nation for its members and other Basques in Spain. ETA, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/topic/ETA (last visited Dec. 21, 2014). This group conducted
bombings and other attacks in Spain throughout the 20th century. Id.
126. B. Loveday, Government and Accountability of the Police, in POLICING ACROSS THE
WORLD: ISSUES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 117, at 132, 142. Loveday
describes America's police forces as "fragmented" because of the Framers' intent to
separate arms of societal control from the government as much as possible. Id. This view
also comports with the original purpose of the Posse Comitatus Act as its founding
principle was to ensure the military did not involve itself with local police affairs, thus
continuing the trend of decentralization. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385.
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militarization shift has not only confined itself to the Western nations of
the world; non-Western nations have militarized their police forces to
some degree to combat their own particular threats, thus creating a
"world risk society" for these nations as well.
The following section provides an in-depth exploration of policing in
the People's Republic of China and how China created its policing
capabilities to combat threat. As a final preliminary matter before
entering this discussion, because of the revolutionary nature of the
current global political climate, Beck proposes that revolutions of
government demonstrate the social power of threat that nations feel. 127
Giddens adds that people no longer respect authoritarianism in
nondemocratic societies. 128 Thus, today, authoritarian national leaders
understand and sense this loss of respect and will do whatever
necessary, using their militarized police forces, to prepare for the risk of
revolution, stemming from other world revolutions.
A. The People's Republic of China and the Umbrella Revolution
The Arab Spring began in Tunisia and subsequently spread to other
nations in Northern Africa, including Egypt. 129 The toppling of Egypt's
longstanding regime, along with those of Tunisia and Libya, placed the
Chinese national government on high alert for the possibility of
revolution against the Communist regime, especially inside Hong
Kong. 130 Historically under British control, Hong Kong is an area which
has not been fully immersed in Maoist ideology and thus remains more
autonomous from government control when compared to other areas. 31
The latest showing of political dissent arose from the news that Hong
Kong residents would soon only be able to vote for government office
candidates that were pre-approved by Beijing and Hong Kong
Communist leaders. 132 Hong Kong citizens took to the street to protest
this monumental election power-snatch only to be met by state riot
police, who approached the largely peaceful crowd with pepper spray
and tear gas. 133 Such a showing of political dissent is not uncommon in
127. See BECK, WORLD RISK SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 66.
128. See GIDDENS, supra note 7, at 72.
129. Eva Bellin, Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East,
44 COMP. POL. 127, 127 (2012).
130. Mohamed Chtatou, The Arab Spring Comes to China, GATESTONE INSTITUTE (Oct.
27, 2014), available at http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4799/arab-spring-china.
131. See Emily Rauhala, Hong Kong Seeks Democracy in China's Shadow, TIME, Oct. 13,
2014, at 14.
132. Id.
133. Id.; see also, e.g., Malcolm Moore & Simon Parry, Heavy-Handed Policing Ignited
Hong Kong Protests, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 29, 2014, 1:30 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
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China; even more disturbingly, showings of police militarization in
China are the historical norm.
The Umbrella Revolutioh, as this recent political protest came to be
known, represents the constant threat that the People's Republic of
China faces and why, in large part, the Chinese government militarized
their police forces in the regime's infancy. Upon the Communist
takeover, the Chinese police acquired a political mission: using any and
all means to defeat enemies of the state. 134 Moreover, relatively new
changes in Chinese culture and to the nation's constitution after Mao's
death transitioned China into a nation that actively suppresses dissent
against Communism while maintaining a market economy, thus
attempting market reform while censoring dissent. 135
After Mao's demise, Deng Xiaoping assumed command over China
and realized the need for swift modernization. 136 Thus, Deng and
subsequent Chinese premiers embarked on modifying the Chinese
Constitution 137 and updating the government. Because of these efforts,
China now possesses a "state capitalist" economy, mixing socialism with
capitalism. 138 However, the people sensed this shift in economics and
enjoyed their new success in business; they began and continue to voice
their opposition to the remnants of the Maoist Chinese government,
news/worldnews/asia/hongkong/1 1128036/Heavy-handed-policing-ignited-Hong-Kong-
protests.html.
134. KAM C. WONG, CHINESE POLICING: HISTORY AND REFORM 97 (2009). Mao oversaw
the police's framing and ensured that policing would contain a militaristic mentality. See
id. at 99.
135. See ANDRADE, supra note 121, at 45.
136. See id. Beginning in July 1980, liberalization was in full swing, and Deng also
modified the use of weapons and tactics by agents of the Ministry of Public Security. See
id.; see also WONG, supra note 134, at 157. Wong states that Deng's modification to
policing in China shifted "law and order" into the forefront of policing duties, above
preserving the government's power. See id. at 164. However, as seen today, the police still
enforce internal laws and investigate counterrevolutionaries. Id.
137. See XIANFA art. 11 & 15. (1982) (China). Article 11, § 1 states, "Individual, private
and other non-public economies that exist within the limits prescribed by law are major
components of the socialist market economy." XIANFA art. 11. The amended Article 15
states: "The state has put into practice a socialist market economy. The State strengthens
the formulation of economic laws, improves macro adjustment and control and forbids
according to law any units or individuals from interfering with the social economic order."
XIANFA art. 15 (amended 1988). These two particular articles have given rise to dissent
after Deng's modernization movement.
138. John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, The State of the State: The Global Contest
for the Future of Government, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2014, at 118, 128; accord
Telephone Interview with Victor Kappeler, Ph. D., Foundation Professor and Dean of the
School of Justice Studies, Eastern Kentucky University (Dec. 14, 2014) (stating that the
breakdown of communism and the new part of the economy caused and continues to cause
much unrest).
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which then suppresses any dissent through the use of its police forces. 139
Demonstrations gained further steam due to the Arab Spring.' 40
Chinese police forces include the People's Armed Police, which is housed
under the Ministry of Public Security.' 41 The People's Armed Police,
created in 1983, derives part of its force directly from the People's
Liberation Army and is treated equally alongside the Army. 142 With
over one million officers, this particular force's status and importance in
China has increased dramatically since Tiananmen Square; in fact, the
Central Military Committee appointed the People's Armed Police as the
first mobilized force if domestic upheaval is afoot.143
Against this backdrop, clearly, the People's Republic of China
constitutes a world risk society because of the constant risk its
government faces from vocal dissenters. As Beck articulates, the social
power of threat of revolution, especially in authoritarian societies,
currently plagues several nations of the world. 4 4 For example, the Arab
Spring resulted in the collapse of many authoritarian regimes, causing
stirs amongst other similarly situated nations to react to these
revolutionary changes. 145 Indeed, Giddens observes that some nations'
efforts to democratize their governments have stalled,146 and when
citizens become invigorated and ready to protest, the governments are
ready to flex their muscles to quell any possibility of insurrection.
Here, the move to modernize caused constitutional change, which
led to further protest in China because of the clash between various
constitutional articles. For example, Article Thirty-five of the Chinese
Constitution claims that Chinese citizens enjoy freedoms such as speech
139. See Jacques deLisle, Security First? Patterns and Lessons from China's Use of Law
to Address National Security Threats, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POLY 397, 399 (2010). The
author claims that the Chinese legal order regarding the political state remains
completely Leninist during times of perceived or actual dire peril. Id. at 398. Such perilous
activities toward the state include threats to national security, social order, and the
regime's ability to control its people and ensure its hold on power amidst incidents of mass
protest. Id. at 399. The national government recently passed several new laws providing
authority to contain and eliminate "rebellion, riots, large-scale serious criminal violence,
terror attacks, and other situations imperiling national security." Id. at 407. The author
argues that these new measures are superfluous because there already is enough Chinese
law dealing with threat containment. Id. at 407-08.
140. See Bellin, supra note 129, at 127.
141. People's Armed Police, GLOBAL SECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intel]J
worldlchinalpap.htm (last modified July 28, 2011); see also Ministry of Public Security,
GLOBAL SECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/china/mps.htm (last
modified Mar. 4, 2014).
142. People's Armed Police, supra note 141.
143. Id.; see also, e.g., WONG, supra note 134, at 161.
144. See BECK, WORLD RISK SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 66.
145. Bellin, supra note 129, at 127.
146. GIDDENS, supra note 7, at 71-72.
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and demonstration, similar to the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights.147
However, Article Twenty-eight allows the State to suppress
counterrevolutionary activities and penalizes activities that endanger
public security or disrupt the socialist economy. 148 While Chinese
citizens can protest, seemingly any protest that does not embrace
revolutionary (i.e., Communist) values and rhetoric may be suppressed
by the police. Statistics indicate that many mass incidents occur, and
police normally respond to these, especially the larger incidents, with
force comparable to the Umbrella Revolution. 149
After examining the changing Chinese constitutional scene, where
many Chinese are speaking out and protesting against Communist rule,
the move to militarize the police is the easy answer for the national
government. By providing the police with the authority to use heavy-
handed tactics to stop a future rebellion, the government owns their
risk, thereby attempting to stop future issues with risk and threat.
Clearly, world police forces underwent a vast shift in policing via the
law to face whatever threat each faces in the foreseeable future.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AT ALL LEVELS OF THE GLOBE
Each nation facing militarization of their police forces by law
because of global risk faces an immense challenge in the future: the
decision whether to continue with this choice or to revert to another
method of policing. Although many nations face this global risk
conundrum, the threats facing each affected nation may be different,
necessitating different legal solutions.
First, from a philosophical standpoint, historical evidence should
drive the law behind police militarization. Rather than deciding what
possible risks face the nation and enacting militarization legislation to
combat these alleged risks (which may or may not be realized), nations
should examine what currently or formerly plagues it before devising
147. XIANFA art. 35. Article 35 states, "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy
freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of
demonstration." XIANFA art. 35; accord U.S. CONST. amend. I.
148. XIANFA art. 28. Article 28 states, "The State maintains public order and suppresses
treasonable and other criminal activity that endanger State security; it penalizes actions
that endanger public security and disrupt the socialist economy and other criminal
activities .. " XIANFA art. 28.
149. See Ministry of Public Security, supra note 141. The source indicates that hundreds
of thousands of mass incidents occur each year due, in large part, to the liberal definition
of "mass incident." Id. Mass incidents may include numbers from ten people to thousands.
See id.
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legislation to combat the issue. 150 By examining the past, nations would
understand the primary risks they face before expending time and
resources combating real or perceived threats. Therefore, for example, if
terrorism threatened a nation's security in the present and past,
legislation that is future-oriented but originates as a reaction to the past
and present may be better tailored to meet the needs of that nation.
Thus, if the police are militarized in some fashion, the militarization
may be more narrowly tailored to the specific needs of the problem
rather than excessively shifting in anticipation of threats.
After examining the United States' gradual shift towards police
militarization, one possible solution is to begin reinforcing the Posse
Comitatus Act, giving increased shrift to its plain language. By
interpreting the Act's language in the broadest sense, the military
would be prohibited from taking part in any law enforcement activities
in any way. Thus, equipment and training could no longer be provided
by any branch of the military. Clearly, this solution would help cure the
United States' militarization movement, but this solution may not be
practicable. For example, if threats to security involve heavy weaponry,
the government would not want officers to confront this situation as
everyday police but rather as a paramilitary unit.151 Therefore, the most
realistic solution to America's police militarization is to continue the
1033 program with specified limitations. Instead of allowing law
enforcement agencies to request any and all equipment it may want
without much review, an extensive review mechanism could be
statutorily created, paying particular attention to factors such as size of
the agency's jurisdiction, population and crime statistics of the
jurisdiction, and the agency's current capabilities of facing common
threats. To provide further legal credibility, any and all prescribed
factors should be written into the statute; more particularly, a provision
stating that each statutory factor must be considered on the record
provides a presumption of full consideration to the particular agency's
needs weighted against the need to limit the militarization movement.
150. See generally GIDDENS, supra note 7 (identifying globalization as a cultural force
that brings larger risk and uncertainty and urging nations to respond to the demands of a
global age).
151. See Fisher, supra note 24, at 5. Fisher states that the Columbine High School
shooting drastically increased the desire for militarized policing. Id. There, SWAT officers
did not enter the school as quickly as they should have. Id. In fact, officers entered two
hours after the shooting began. Id. First-responding patrol officers were untrained in
paramilitary policing techniques; Fisher claims that, had these officers been properly
trained in a paramilitary fashion, the shooting could have been mitigated. Id.
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This overall statutory remedy, in some variation, would surely "put
teeth" into the Posse Comitatus Act.152
However, for nations such as the People's Republic of China, which
face risks from internal societal dissent stemming from the government
itself, a comprehensive solution lies with the government: a full
constitutional overhaul, providing the people with increased power. 153
By overhauling the constitution of the challenged government, the basic
threat of mutiny posed by the nation's society may be lessened because
it will be appeased. Because, however, this solution is quite unlikely to
occur naturally, a remedy that permits the challenged government to
remain in power is desirable: to delineate specific situations where
militarized policing is necessary. Instead of sending in the paramilitary
police, such as the People's Armed Police, when demonstrations occur, a
lighter method of control could be undertaken in certain situations. For
example, during peaceful demonstrations such as the Umbrella
Revolution, police should not resort to tear gas to disperse the crowd
unless it becomes unruly and riotous.1 54 Two-fold risk prevention occurs
in this scenario: the people feel increased freedom to demonstrate and
voice their views on possible changes, while the government may not be
actively challenged in violent ways.
Finally, international institutions should involve themselves in the
prevention of global police militarization. Multiple nations have created
institutions, such as the United Nations, to assist each other with global
issues. Having been established as a global phenomenon, police
militarization is another global challenge many nations face. If the
United Nations created a committee, panel, or study committed to
finding solutions to police militarization, surely the global threats
causing this militarization would be analyzed and eventually controlled.
Simply put, for a global phenomenon such as global risk that causes
police militarization, a global body dedicated to solving this issue
provides the best means of global mitigation and prevention.
152. Hill & Beger, supra note 23, at 35. Hill and Beger argue for a complete overhaul of
the Posse Comitatus Act; this overhaul would prohibit both the transfer of military
equipment and training to civilian law enforcement. Id. However, Fisher appears to
suggest that some militarization is necessary because of certain threats that communities
face today, such as school shootings or hostage situations. See generally FISHER, supra
note 24, 4-8 (discussing the Columbine High School killing spree as a catalyst for the
militarization of police).
153. See GIDDENS, supra note 7, at 75. Giddens believes that a deepening of democracy
is needed where authoritarian power is being threatened. Id.
154. See generally Rauhala, supra note 131 (police sparked outrage when they resorted
to the use of tear gas on pro-democracy protestors).
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CONCLUSION
Risk and threat are both as old as time; however, in today's
globalized world, risk and threat can arise from global issues. As
Giddens and Beck observe, modern nations participating in the global
field look to the future to decide on how to contain risk as it presents
itself rather than examining the past. This shift combined with various
globalized threats produced the global shift towards police
militarization; different world governments enacted legislation to
permit this shift so as to contain or prevent the risk each faced. In the
United States, the undermining of the Posse Comitatus Act with various
statutory exceptions and court decisions in response to the
transnational drug threat militarized the police. Of course, the United
States merely wished to stop this threat, but now, SWAT teams carry
out ordinary search warrants. Thus, this movement may have spread
further than originally anticipated.
Examination of other nations, include those of Western Europe,
demonstrate that many possess a paramilitarized police force, most
notably through their respective gendarmes. These Western nations
maintain and use these forces much like American SWAT teams are
used, to quell civil unrest and in other specialized, highly violent
situations. Finally, an examination of the People's Republic of China
indicates that its police force has always maintained a political element,
one that seeks out and eliminates risk and threat directed at toppling
the Communist regime. With the recent topplings of several Arab
authoritarian governments during the Arab Spring, the Chinese have
actively used the law to continue to militarize their police, primarily the
People's Armed Police, to stop any possible insurrection.
Several solutions exist. Statutorily, nations such as the United
States and China should attempt to limit the flow of militarization to
their police forces. A deeper philosophical solution would be to only
militarize the police for risk that is known due to its manifestation in
the past or in the present. With this done, it may be that Giddens's and
Beck's theory regarding risk societies being forward-viewing will cease
to hold truth.
However, these solutions, at least to one renowned criminologist,
will not come to pass. Victor Kappeler believes that piecemeal federal
legislation and a continuing 1033 program is what the future holds. 155
While investigations over this militaristic shift occur in the United
States, citizens prize security in the face of risk and threat, thus
permitting the continuation of this shift. Sadly, Alexander Hamilton's
155. See Telephone Interview with Victor Kappeler, supra note 138.
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prophetic statement regarding threat survives today and, viewing
Kappeler's prediction, will continue to be true well into the twenty-first
century. 156
156. THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Hamilton stated: "Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national
conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates." Id.
